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Abstract
We consider a modified version of the BB84 quantum key distribution pro-
tocol in which the angle between two different bases are less than pi/4. We
show that the channel parameter estimate becomes the same as the origi-
nal protocol with sufficiently many transmitted qubits. On the other hand,
the statistical correlation between bits transmitted in one basis and those re-
ceived in the other basis becomes stronger as the angle between two bases
becomes narrower. If the angle is very small, the statistical correlation be-
tween bits transmitted in one basis and those received in the other basis is
as strong as those received in the same basis as transmitting basis, which
means that the modified protocol can generate almost twice as long secret
key as the original protocol, provided that Alice and Bob choose two dif-
ferent bases with almost the same probability. We also point out that the
reverse reconciliation often gives different amount of secret key to the direct
reconciliation over Pauli channels with our modified protocol.
PACS number: 03.67.Dd
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1 Introduction
The Bennett-Brassard 1984 protocol (BB84 protocol) [2] is one of the most-
known protocols for quantum key distribution (QKD). In this protocol, the sender,
Alice, sends qubits in one of four quantum states, represented by quantum state
vectors |0〉, |1〉, |+〉 = (|0〉+ |1〉)/√2, |−〉 = (−|0〉+ |1〉)/√2, where {|0〉, |1〉}
forms an orthonormal basis. Then the receiver, Bob, measures them with either
{|0〉, |1〉} or {|+〉, |−〉} basis. After that, Alice publicly announces to which
{|0〉, |1〉} or {|+〉, |−〉} basis each qubit belongs. Bob discard the measurement
outcomes whose bases do not contain the transmitted states. We call such mea-
surement mismatched measurement in this paper. After that, Alice and Bob per-
form the information reconciliation and the privacy amplification to obtain the
same secret key as described in Ref. [15]. In this standard protocol, we have
|+〉 = cosθ |0〉+ sinθ |1〉 and |−〉 = −sinθ |0〉+ cosθ |1〉 with θ = pi/4. In this
paper we shall call θ as the angle between two bases.
As far as the authors know, there is no literature that shows a merit of using
smaller values of θ in the BB84 protocol, while Tamaki et al. [16] quantitatively
demonstrated the merit of adjusting the angle between two different quantum
states in the Bennett 1992 (B92) protocol [1]. A possible reason for the absence
of consideration of narrower angle θ < pi/4 is that the narrower angle makes it
difficult to obtain a meaningful lower bound on the amount of secret key by the
conventional channel parameter estimation as described in Section 2.2. This dif-
ficulty leads us to use the accurate channel parameter estimation method [17] for
the BB84 protocol with narrower angle. We shall show that over any quantum
channel between Alice and Bob, including Pauli channels, we can obtain almost
the same amount of secret key from mismatched measurement outcomes when the
angle between two bases is sufficiently narrow, while obtaining asymptotically the
same amount of key per transmitted qubit from matched measurement outcomes,
by using the accurate estimation method. We note that we already considered to
obtain secret key from mismatched measurement outcomes in Ref. [11]. However
Ref. [11] was not so useful because we cannot obtain secret key if the channel is
a Pauli one.
On the other hand, the amount of secret key is the same in the direct and
reverse reconciliations in the standard BB84 protocol over Pauli channels [15],
even if we use the accurate channel parameter estimation [17]. In contrast to
this, we also point out that the reverse reconciliation [4, 12] often gives different
amount of secret key to the direct reconciliation over Pauli channels with our
modified protocol.
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This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a modified version of
the BB84 protocol, its security, and its performance analysis. Section 3 gives
concluding remarks.
2 Protocol
2.1 Outline of the protocol
In this section, we shall show a variant of the BB84 protocol that tries to extract
secret key from mismatched measurement outcomes. Section 2.1 describes an out-
line of the protocol, Section 2.2 derives the amount of secret key, and Section 2.3
considers the reverse reconciliation. We define the matrices X and Z representing
the bit error and the phase error, respectively, as
X |0〉= |1〉, X |1〉= |0〉,
Z|+〉 = |−〉, Z|−〉= |+〉,
and Y = iXZ. We also fix 0 < θ ≤ pi/4 and define
|+θ 〉 = cosθ |0〉+ sinθ |1〉,
|−θ 〉 = −sinθ |0〉+ cosθ |1〉.
1. Alice makes a random qubit sequence according to the i.i.d. uniform distri-
bution on {|0〉, |1〉, |+θ 〉, |−θ 〉} and sends it to Bob.
2. Bob chooses the {|0〉, |1〉} basis or {|+θ 〉, |−θ 〉} basis uniformly randomly
for each received qubit and measures it by the chosen basis.
3. Alice publicly announces which basis {|0〉, |1〉} or {|+θ 〉, |−θ 〉} each trans-
mitted qubit belongs to. Bob also publicly announces which basis was used
for measurement of each qubit.
4. Suppose that there are 2n qubits transmitted in the {|0〉, |1〉} basis and mea-
sured with the {|+θ 〉, |−θ 〉} basis by Bob. Index those qubits by 1, . . . ,
2n. Define the bit xi = 0 if Alice’s i-th qubit was |0〉, and xi = 1 otherwise.
Define the bit yi = 0 if Bob’s measurement outcome for i-th qubit was |+θ 〉,
and yi = 1 otherwise.
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5. Suppose also that there are 2n′ qubits transmitted in the {|0〉, |1〉} basis and
measured with the {|0〉, |1〉} basis by Bob. Index those qubits by 1, . . . ,
2n′. Define the bit ai = 0 if Alice’s i-th qubit was |0〉, and ai = 1 otherwise.
Define the bit bi = 0 if Bob’s measurement outcome for i-th qubit was |0〉,
and bi = 1 otherwise.
6. Suppose also that there are 2n′′ qubits transmitted in the {|+θ 〉, |−θ 〉} basis
and measured with the {|+θ 〉, |−θ 〉} basis by Bob. Index those qubits by
1, . . . , 2n′′. Define the bit αi = 0 if Alice’s i-th qubit was |+θ 〉, and αi = 1
otherwise. Define the bit βi = 0 if Bob’s measurement outcome for i-th
qubit was |+θ 〉, and βi = 1 otherwise.
7. For each combination of the transmission and the reception bases, Alice and
Bob publicly announce the half of transmitted qubits and measurement out-
comes. They conduct the channel parameter estimation described in Section
2.2. We also define
q1 =
|{i ∈ S | xi 6= yi}|
|S| , q2 =
|{i ∈ S′ | ai 6= bi}|
|S′| ,
where S and S′ are the set of indices that are announced for channel param-
eter estimation.
8. Alice and Bob decide1 a linear code C1 of length n such that its decoding
error probability is sufficiently small over all the binary symmetric channel
whose crossover probability is close to q1. Let H1 be a parity check matrix
for C1, ~x be Alice’s remaining (not announced) bits among xi’s, and ~y be
Bob’s remaining bits among yi’s.
9. Alice publicly announces the syndrome H1~x.
10. Bob computes the error vector~e such that H1~e = H1~y−H1~x by the decoding
algorithm for C1. With high probability~y−~e =~x.
11. Alice chooses a subspace C2 ⊂ C1 with dimC2 = n(1− S(X |E)+ ε) uni-
formly randomly, where ε > 0 and S(X |E) denotes the conditional von Neu-
mann entropy of Alice’s bit xi given the quantum state of the environment
E as defined in Refs. [13, 14], which can be regarded as the eavesdropper
Eve’s ambiguity on Alice’s bit xi. After that she publicly announces her
choice of C2. The final shared secret key is the coset~x+C2.
1One can also use the Slepian-Wolf code used in Ref. [17].
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Provided that ε > 0, the privacy amplification theorem with quantum eavesdrop-
per’s memory [13, 14] guarantees that that the final key ~x+C2 becomes secure
in the sense of Refs. [13, 14] as n → ∞, which roughly means that the final key
and the quantum state of the environment become statistically independent and
that the final key has an almost uniform distribution on the set C1/C2. We shall
consider the amount of secret key obtained by the above protocol in Section 2.2.
2.2 Amount of secret key
We shall use the accurate channel parameter estimation [17], which gives asymp-
totically more secret key than the conventional estimation. This procedure is as
follows: We do not make any assumption on the quantum channel between Al-
ice and Bob, so the channel is specified by 12 real parameters. For 16 pairs (|u〉,
|v〉) ∈ {|0〉, |1〉, |+θ 〉, |−θ 〉}2, we record the 16 relative frequencies of the events
in which |u〉 is transmitted and |v〉 is observed as the measurement outcome, which
enable us to estimate 6 out of 12 channel parameters. After estimating the part of
parameters, we use the minimum of S(X |E) over all the possible quantum chan-
nels, that is, we use the worst case estimate of S(X |E) of quantum channels giv-
ing the 16 recorded relative frequencies, as done in the conventional estimation
[7, 13, 14]. The set of estimatable parameters with 0 < θ < pi/4 is the same as
θ = pi/4. The reason is as follows: Since the linear space spanned by {|0〉〈0|,
|1〉〈1|, |+θ 〉〈+θ |, |−θ 〉〈−θ |} is the same for all 0 < θ ≤ pi/4 and the expecta-
tion of the relative frequency of sending |u〉 and observing |v〉 is proportional to
Tr[Λ(|u〉〈u|)|v〉〈v|] for any quantum channel Λ, there always exists a one-to-one
linear relation that translates the set of 16 relative frequencies with θ < pi/4 to that
with θ = pi/4. Therefore, the estimate of the worst case S(X |E) does not depend
on the value of θ . This means that the amount of secret key from matched mea-
surement outcomes remains asymptotically the same even if we use θ narrower
than pi/4.
We cannot use a straightforward generalization of the conventional channel
parameter estimation, that is to record two relative frequencies of the event (a) in
which |0〉 is sent and |1〉 is observed or |1〉 is sent and |0〉 is observed, and the
event (b) in which |+θ 〉 is sent and |−θ 〉 is observed or |−θ 〉 is sent and |+θ 〉
is observed. The reason of unavailability of the conventional channel parameter
estimation is as follows: We cannot estimate the parameters of the Pauli channel
that is obtained as the partial twirling2 [3] of the actual quantum channel, because
2See also Eq. (12) of Ref. [8], in which the partial twirling is called the discrete twirling.
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the relative frequency of the event (b) also depends3 on the non-diagonal elements
in the Choi matrix [6] of the actual quantum channel with respect to the Bell basis
as well as the diagonal elements unless θ = pi/4, and the 4 diagonal elements in
the Choi matrix specify the Pauli channel obtained by the partial twirling. Since
the standard technique is to bound the required dimension of C2 in Step 11 over
the actual channel from above by the required dimC2 over its partially twirled
channel, the inability to estimate the partially twirled channel prevents us from
obtaining a useful upper bound on dimC2 of the actual channel. Thus, it is difficult
to ensure that the worst case estimate of dimC2 is independent of θ by the above
generalization of the conventional channel parameter estimation, and we have to
use the 16 relative frequencies to bound dimC2 from above. Note that Tamaki
et al. [16] already observed similar dependence of the worst case estimate on the
angle between two quantum states in the B92 protocol [1].
The amount of secret key is [13, 14]
S(X |E)−h(q1)
from single bit xi not announced for channel parameter estimation, while this
amount is
S(X |E)−h(q2) (1)
from ai, where h() denotes the binary entropy function. Since q1 → q2 as θ → 0
and h() is a continuous function, we conclude that we can obtain almost the same
amount of secret key from xi as ai.
2.3 Reverse reconciliation
The reverse reconciliation [4, 12] is the method of reconciliation in which Bob
publicly announces the syndrome H1~y in Step 9 instead of Alice, Alice computes
~y in Step 10 instead of Bob, and the final key is generated from ~y. The standard
way of reconciliation [15] is called the direct reconciliation. In order to give a
simpler exposition of the main contribution, we have restricted ourselves to the
direct reconciliation up to this point. In this subsection we shall consider the
reverse reconciliation and point out that the amount of secret key is often different
in the reverse reconciliation to the direct one over a Pauli channel.
We can also use the same parity check matrix H1 in Step 8 since ~x can be
regarded as the output of the binary symmetric channel with crossover probability
3The relative frequency of the event (a) is independent of the non-diagonal elements in the
Choi matrix.
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q1 with input~y. We have to change dimC2 in Step 11 to dimC2 = n(1−S(Y |E)+
ε), where S(Y |E) denotes the conditional von Neumann entropy of Bob’s bit yi
given the quantum state of the environment E. We have to compute the minimum
value of S(Y |E) over quantum channels that give the recorded relative frequencies.
Hereafter we assume that the channel between Alice and Bob is a Pauli chan-
nel that sends a qubit density matrix ρ to
Γ(ρ) = (1− rX − rY − rZ)ρ + rX XρX + rYY ρY + rZZρZ,
instead of a general qubit channel that is not necessarily a Pauli one. We define
pX = rX + rY , pZ = rZ + rY .
It is well-known that the worst case S(X |E) is 1−h(pZ) [7, 13, 14].
In the evaluation of the worst case S(Y |E), Bob’s bit Y can be regarded as the
measurement outcome in the {|0〉, |1〉} basis on the output of the unitary channel
rotating |+θ 〉 to |0〉 and |−θ 〉 to |1〉, connected to the actual channel. The Pauli
channel followed by a rotation is a unital channel, which outputs the completely
mixed state if the input is completely mixed. This observation enables us to apply
the formula for the worst case S(Y |E) over unital channels given in Proposition 2
and Remark 6 of Ref. [17], which gives
S(Y |E)= 1−h(pX)−h(pZ)+h

1+
√
(1−2pX)2 cos2 2θ +(1−2pZ)2 sin2 2θ
2

 .
We can see that S(Y |E)→ 1−h(pZ) as θ → 0 and S(Y |E)→ 1−h(pX) as θ →
pi/4, which confirm our intuition. Observe also that generally S(X |E) 6= S(Y |E)
when pX 6= pZ .
By using a similar idea, we can obtain Eve’s ambiguity on Alice’s bit αi that
is transmitted in the {|+θ 〉, |−θ 〉} basis. By the continuity of the von Neumann
entropy, we can also see that the amount of secret key from αi converges to Eq.
(1) obtained from ai as n → ∞ and θ → 0. Therefore, the conclusion in Section
2.2 also holds for qubits transmitted by the {|+θ 〉, |−θ 〉} basis.
3 Concluding remarks
We have shown that from mismatched measurement outcomes we can obtain as
much secret key per transmitted qubit as matched measurement outcomes over any
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channels if we make the angle between two bases sufficiently narrow. The same
conclusion holds for the six-state protocol [5] and the variants of the standard
BB84 protocols with the noisy preprocessing [13, 14], and the advantage distilla-
tion [7, 18]. We have also pointed out that the reverse reconciliation often gives
different amount of secret key to the direct reconciliation over Pauli channels with
our modified protocol, which is contrasting to the standard BB84 protocol [15],
and that there is difficulty to use the conventional channel parameter estimation if
the angle between two bases is narrower than pi/4.
The advantage of the proposed protocol is that we can obtain 1− h(pX)−
h(pZ) bits of secret key per single qubit that is not used for channel parameter
estimation. The same advantage is also realized when we decrease the ratio of
the number of transmitted qubits in the {|+〉, |−〉} basis to that in the {|0〉, |1〉}
basis [9, 10]. Although the proposed method, the method in Refs. [9, 10], and
their combination have exactly the same performance in the asymptotic limit of
infinitely many qubits, they may have different performances in the finite number
of qubits. The identification of the best method among these three methods in the
finite setting is a future research agenda. This identification might be analytically
difficult as stated in the introduction of Ref. [9].
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